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ARTICLES
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
John R. Walk *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will summarize recent developments of interest to
practitioners handling civil cases in the courts of the Common-
wealth of Virginia. Specifically included are relevant decisions of
the Supreme Court of Virginia dating from the opinions an-
nounced on January 10, 2003 to those announced on April 23,
2004; changes to the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia an-
nounced during the same period; and legislation enacted by the
General Assembly at its 2003 session, effective July 1, 2003, and
at its 2004 session, effective July 1, 2004.
II. EXPERT TESTIMONY
In Whitley v. Chamouris,' the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that expert testimony was not necessary to prove causation and
damages in a legal malpractice case.' In that case, Chamouris
had hired Whitley to bring various causes of action in federal
court.3 One week before trial, and without Chamouris's consent,
Whitley agreed to a dismissal with prejudice of all but one cause
* Shareholder, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1977, College of
William & Mary; J.D., 1980, University of Richmond School of Law. He is an Adjunct As-
sociate Professor of Law at the University of Richmond School of Law.
1. 265 Va. 9, 574 S.E.2d 251 (2003).
2. Id. at 11, 574 S.E.2d at 253.
3. Id. at 10, 574 S.E.2d at 252.
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of action.4 Chamouris fired Whitley, successfully settled the re-
maining cause of action in state court, and then sued Whitley for
legal malpractice.5 Chamouris obtained summary judgment on
the issues of negligence and breach of contract.6 Thus, the only is-
sues tried were causation and damages.7
The trial of a legal malpractice action "involves a 'case within
the case,"' in which the plaintiff must prove that, but for the al-
leged negligence of the defendant, he would have prevailed in the
underlying action.' Damages are the amount of the likely recov-
ery in the underlying action.' Significantly, Chamouris presented
no expert testimony on either issue. ° Nonetheless, the case was
allowed to go to the jury, which decided in favor of Chamouris."
On appeal, Whitley cited several cases 2 for the proposition that
these issues are to be decided by the jury after consideration of
expert testimony."3 The Supreme Court of Virginia, however,
distinguished these cases, holding that "these cases do not stand
for the proposition that such expert testimony is required in each
instance." 4 In Whitley, the expert testimony would have either
constituted "a prediction of what some other fact finder would
have concluded or an evaluation of the legal merits of Chamouris'
claims." 5 The former, according to the Supreme Court of Virginia,
would have been unduly speculative since "[n]o witness can pre-
dict the decision of a jury," and the latter would have been an in-





8. Id. at 11, 574 S.E.2d at 252-53 (citing Campbell v. Bettius, 244 Va. 347, 352, 421
S.E.2d 433, 436 (1992)).
9. See, e.g., Duvall, Blackburn, Hale & Downey v. Siddiqui, 243 Va. 494, 416 S.E.2d
448 (1992).
10. Whitley, 265 Va. at 10, 574 S.E.2d at 252.
11. Id.
12. Ripper v. Bain, 253 Va. 197, 482 S.E.2d 832 (1997); Heyward & Lee Constr. Co. v.
Sands, Anderson, Marks & Miller, 249 Va. 54, 453 S.E.2d 270 (1995); Seaward Int'l, Inc. v.
Price Waterhouse, 239 Va. 585, 391 S.E.2d 283 (1990).
13. Whitley, 265 Va. at 11, 574 S.E.2d at 252.
14. Id. The issue of negligence was not before the jury in this case. Thus, there was no
need for expert testimony on the standard of care. It was on this basis that the court dis-
tinguished the case cited by Whitley. See id.
15. Id., 574 S.E.2d at 253.
16. Id. Virginia Code section 8.01-401.3(B) provides that otherwise proper expert tes-
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III. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
The case of Williams v. Condit" involved the application of
Virginia Code section 8.01-397, also known as the "dead man's
statute."i" At trial, Williams was the only witness who testified in
her case-in-chief to the facts surrounding the automobile accident
in question.'9 The driver of the other vehicle, Ross Condit, died af-
ter the automobile accident from unrelated causes.2" Katarina
Condit, the decedent's personal representative and also a passen-
ger in the car at the time of the accident, moved to strike on the
basis that Williams's uncorroborated evidence failed to meet the
requirements of Virginia Code section 8.01-397.21 The trial judge
took the motion under advisement.22 Ms. Condit was then called
to testify to her recollection of the accident, which was materially
different from that presented by Williams.23 At the conclusion of
the case, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to
strike.24
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed and re-
manded.25 The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Hassell,
focused on compliance with the dead man's statute.26 It rejected
the defendant's contention that, in ruling on the motion to strike,
the trial court was compelled to consider only the plaintiffs evi-
dence.27 Citing several cases,28 the court held that "if a circuit
timony shall not be excluded because it goes to the "ultimate issue;" however, "in no event
shall such witness be permitted to express any opinion which constitutes a conclusion of
law." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-401.3(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
17. 265 Va. 49, 574 S.E.2d 241 (2003).
18. Id. at 50, 574 S.E.2d at 242. The Dead Man's Statute provides that "in an action
by or against a person who ... is incapable of testifying. . . no judgment or decree shall be
rendered in favor of an adverse or interested party founded on his uncorroborated testi-
mony." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-397 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
19. Williams, 265 Va. at 50, 574 S.E.2d at 242.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 50-51, 574 S.E.2d at 242.
22. Id. at 51, 574 S.E.2d at 242.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 53, 574 S.E.2d at 243.
26. Id. at 50, 574 S.E.2d at 242.
27. Id. at 52, 574 S.E.2d at 242.
28. Austin v. Shoney's, Inc., 254 Va. 134, 486 S.E.2d 285 (1997); Estate of Taylor v.
Flair Prop. Assocs., 248 Va. 410, 448 S.E.2d 413 (1994); Kendrick v. Vaz, Inc., 244 Va. 380,
421 S.E.2d 447 (1992); Hadeed v. Medic-24, Ltd., 237 Va. 277, 377 S.E.2d 589 (1989);
Spangler v. Commonwealth, 188 Va. 436, 50 S.E.2d 265 (1948).
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court grants a defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs evidence
at the conclusion of a trial, we will consider all the evidence, in-
cluding evidence presented by the defendant."29 The court simi-
larly held this rule to apply where the motion is made at the con-
clusion of the plaintiffs case, but taken under advisement and
ruled upon at the conclusion of trial.3 ° The court held that Ms.
Condit's testimony satisfied the corroboration requirement of Vir-
ginia Code section 8.10-397 and reversed the trial court.3 '
The concurring opinion by Justice Lacy32 focused on whether
the dead man's statute was correctly applied in the case. 3 Justice
Lacy's opinion stated that the dead man's statute is inapplicable
"when another interested party testifies to a version of the facts
on behalf of the party unable to testify."34 Thus, the proper issue
was not whether Ms. Condit's testimony tended to corroborate
Williams's version of the facts, but whether the requirement of
corroboration applied at all.35 The concurring opinion agreed with
the majority that the trial court was compelled to consider all the
evidence in ruling on this motion.36 Taking into consideration Ms.
Condit's testimony, the concurring opinion also agreed that the
trial judge erred in granting the motion to strike.37 However, it
was on the basis that the statute was inapplicable and that the
trial judge should have denied the motion to strike.38
29. Williams, 265 Va. at 52, 574 S.E.2d at 242.
30. Id., 574 S.E.2d at 243. The court explained that had the defendant rested and re-
newed the motion to strike, the trial court would have been compelled to rule on the mo-
tion based on the plaintiffs testimony alone. Id. Without expressly stating this, the major-
ity presumably would have affirmed the trial court in this case.
31. Id. at 52-53, 574 S.E.2d at 243.
32. Id. at 53-58, 574 S.E.2d at 243-46 (Lacy, J., concurring). Justice Lacy was joined
by Justices Kinser and Lemons. Id. at 53, 574 S.E.2d at 243 (Lacy, J., concurring).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 54, 574 S.E.2d at 244 (Lacy, J., concurring) (citing Epes' Adm'r v. Hardaway,
135 Va. 80, 115 S.E. 712 (1923)). It is also required that the party testifying have a pecu-
niary interest in the outcome of the litigation. Id. (citing Merchant's Supply Co. v. Ex'rs of
the Estate of John Hughes, 139 Va. 212, 123 S.E. 355 (1924)).
35. Williams, 265 Va. at 55, 574 S.E.2d at 245 (Lacy, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 56, 574 S.E.2d at 245 (Lacy, J., concurring). The concurring opinion also
pointed out that had the defendant rested and renewed the motion, the exception to the
dead man's statute would have been inapplicable and corroboration would have been re-
quired. Id. Presumably, Justices Lacy, Kinser, and Lemons would have affirmed the trial
judge in this event as well.
37. Id. at 56-57, 574 S.E.2d at 245-46 (Lacy, J., concurring).
38. Id.
[Vol. 39:87
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The concurring opinion took issue with the majority's holding
that Ms. Condit's testimony tended to corroborate Williams's tes-
timony.39 Rather, she directly contradicted Williams's version of
the facts.4 ° Stating that "[c]orroboration for purposes of the dead
man's statute requires testimony or other evidence that tends to
support some issue or allegation advanced by the party able to
testify which is essential to sustain a judgment in such party's fa-
vor,"41 the concurring opinion specifically found corroboration to
be lacking in the case. 42 Nonetheless, since the concurring justices
would not have applied the statute at all, they agreed that the
trial judge erred in striking Williams's case.43
IV. RES JUDICATA
In what was probably the most significant procedural decision
of 2003, the Supreme Court of Virginia redefined the doctrine of
res judicata in Davis v. Marshall Homes, Inc. 4 An entire article
could be devoted to this case and its ramifications. Davis arose
out of a series of real estate transactions pursuant to which Davis
lent money to Marshall Homes for the acquisition and alleged
renovation of certain homes.45 Davis filed a motion for judgment
against Marshall Homes alleging that Marshall Homes had mis-
represented the value of the homes, had never intended to reno-
vate the homes, and had fraudulently induced Davis to enter into
the deal.46 The suit was dismissed with prejudice. 7 Thereafter,
Davis again sued Marshall Homes, this time seeking judgment on
notes executed in connection with the transaction.4" The trial
court sustained Marshall Homes' plea of res judicata a9 In a
39. Id. at 57, 574 S.E.2d at 245-46 (Lacy, J., concurring). The concurring opinion
states that "(iun this case, the majority has ignored principles applied in prior relevant
cases [and] adopted positions at odds with, or contrary to, precedent without explanation."
Id. at 58, 574 S.E.2d at 246 (Lacy, J., concurring).
40. See id. at 57, 574 S.E.2d at 246 (Lacy, J., concurring). For example, Ms. Condit
testified that "there were no oncoming cars." Id.
41. Id. (citing Rice v. Charles, 260 Va. 157, 166, 532 S.E.2d 318, 323 (2000)).
42. Id. at 57, 574 S.E.2d at 246 (Lacy, J., concurring).
43. Id. at 57-58, 574 S.E.2d at 246 (Lacy, J., concurring).
44. 265 Va. 159, 576 S.E.2d 504 (2003).
45. Id. at 162, 576 S.E.2d at 505.
46. Id. at 162-63, 576 S.E.2d at 505.
47. Id. at 163, 576 S.E.2d at 505.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 164, 576 S.E.2d at 505-06.
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sharply divided decision, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed
the circuit court.5 °
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Hassell, cited
the familiar statement that "'[tihe bar of res judicata precludes
relitigation of the same cause of action, or any part thereof, which
could have been litigated between the same parties and their
privies."'5 1 The focus of the decision was whether the breach of
contract claim constituted part of the same "cause of action"
which "could have been litigated" in the former action. 2 Recogniz-
ing that both claims arose out of the same "transaction or occur-
rence," 3 the majority specifically rejected this analysis as deter-
mining whether the claims were part of the same "cause of
action." 4 Instead, the majority analyzed the legal elements of the
two claims and the evidence that would be necessary to support
each.55 Reversing the trial court, the majority ruled that the fraud
and breach of contract claims constituted distinct "causes of ac-
tion" and, thus, the similarity of causes of action required to es-
tablish res judicata was absent. 56
Justice Kinser wrote a lengthy and vigorous dissent.57 She em-
phasized that many of the court's prior decisions concerning res
judicata could be explained by Virginia's separation of law and
equity and the former prohibition on joining tort and contract in a
single action.5" Thus, in these cases, the plaintiff confronted a le-
gal bar in the second action to seeking the relief sought in the
50. Id. at 172, 576 S.E.2d at 510.
51. 265 Va. at 164, 576 S.E.2d at 506 (quoting Smith v. Ware, 244 Va. 374, 376, 421
S.E.2d 444, 445 (1992)).
52. See id.
53. This phrase has been used by the General Assembly in adopting a transactional
analysis in other contexts. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-272, -281 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp.
2004) (providing for the joining of all claims arising out of the same transaction or occur-
rence).
54. Davis, 265 Va. at 171, 576 S.E.2d at 510. In so doing, the majority relied upon
Smith v. Ware, 244 Va. 374, 421 S.E.2d 444 (1992), Flora, Flora & Montague, Inc. v. Saun-
ders, 235 Va. 306, 367 S.E.2d 493 (1988), Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 210, 355 S.E.2d 563
(1987), and Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 231 Va. 421, 344 S.E.2d 903 (1986).
Each of these cases was discussed at length in the majority opinion.
55. Davis, 265 Va. at 171-72, 576 S.E.2d at 510.
56. Id. at 172, 576 S.E.2d at 510.
57. Id. at 172-85, 576 S.E.2d at 511-18 (Kinser, J., dissenting). Justice Kinser was
joined by Justices Lacy and Lemons. Id. at 172, 576 S.E.2d at 511 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 173, 576 S.E.2d at 511 (Kinser, J., dissenting). This prohibition was abol-
ished by the adoption of Virginia Code section 8.01-272 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp.
2004).
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previously adjudicated matter. 9 This was not the case in the pre-
sent action in that both actions were filed at law and both sought
only damages.6 ° Instead, the dissenting opinion focused on the
"definable factual transaction" test, which the dissenting justices
asserted had been adopted by the court in Bates v. Devers6' and
reaffirmed in Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria."2 Quoting
from the Restatement of Judgments, the dissenting opinion
stated that "'[t]he present trend is to see [a] claim in factual
terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless
of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief
flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plain-
tiff."'63 Application of the strict "same evidence test" used by the
majority effectively negates the "could have been litigated" por-
tion of the doctrine of res judicata and limits it to "when an un-
successful plaintiff re-files the identical claim based on the same
legal theory."64
Justice Lemons wrote a separate dissent in which he character-
ized it as "unmistakable" that the court had previously adopted
the transactional analysis.65 He asserted that the majority opin-
ion "reverts to the national minority on this issue of great impor-
tance to individuals and businesses alike."66 In particular, he
cited to the typical business dispute which often involves "theo-
ries of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, common law
conspiracy, statutory conspiracy, common law fraud, constructive
fraud, and conversion."67 Under the majority opinion, each would
be permitted to be asserted in separate suits unless the elements
59. See Davis, 265 Va. at 173-74, 576 S.E.2d at 511 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 163, 165, 576 S.E.2d at 505-06.
61. Id. at 174, 576 S.E.2d at 512 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (citing Bates v. Devers, 214
Va. 667, 672 n.8, 202 S.E.2d 917, 921 n.8 (1974)).
62. Id. (citing Allstar Towing, Inc. v. City of Alexandria, 231 Va. 421, 425, 344 S.E.2d
903, 905-06 (1986)).
63. Id. at 179, 576 S.E.2d at 515 (Kinser, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (1980)). The dissent cited several decisions from
courts outside the Commonwealth to further illustrate the modern trend toward a trans-
action analysis. Id. The dissent also noted the General Assembly's adoption of the transac-
tion approach. Id. (referring to the use of the phrase "out of the same transaction or occur-
rence" in Virginia Code section 8.01-281 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
64. Id. at 183, 576 S.E.2d at 517 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
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and proof were identical.6" "Of course, the reason there are sepa-
rate legal theories is precisely because there are differences in the
elements of the causes of action," wrote Justice Lemons.69 This
case will almost certainly prompt further appeals or legislative
action in the area of res judicata in the years to come.
V. STATUTORY CONSPIRACY
Virginia Code section 18.2-499 makes it illegal to conspire for
the purpose of "willfully and maliciously injuring another in his
reputation, trade, business or profession." ° Virginia Code section
18.2-500 provides a civil remedy including recovery of treble
damages and attorneys' fees.7 ' The potential application of this
statute was greatly expanded by the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Feddeman & Co. v. Langan Associates,7 2 in which the
court held a group of employees of an accounting firm who organ-
ized a resignation en masse and formed a competing accounting
firm liable under the statute to their former employer.7 3 In the re-
cent case of Williams v. Dominion Technology Partners,74 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia distinguished Feddeman and reversed a
verdict granted to an employer under fairly comparable circum-
stances.75
Dominion was in the business of providing computer consult-
ants and placing them, either directly or through brokers, with
various companies.76 Williams was recruited by Dominion to ren-
der such services to Stihl, Inc. in connection with a computer up-
grade.77 Although Williams was initially employed on an at-will
68. Id.
69. Id. at 185-86, 576 S.E.2d at 518 (Lemons, J., dissenting).
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-499 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-500 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
72. 260 Va. 35, 530 S.E.2d 668 (2000).
73. Id. at 44, 46, 530 S.E.2d at 673, 675.
74. 265 Va. 280, 576 S.E.2d 752 (2003). For additional discussion of the case in the
context of fiduciary duty and agreements not to compete, see Thomas M. Winn, III &
Lindsey H. Dobbs, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Labor and Employment Law, 39 U.
RICH. L. REV. 285, 298-300 (2004) and Michael F. Urbanski, James R. Creekwood & Ellen
S. Moore, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Antitrust and Trade Regulation Law, 38 U.
RICH. L. REV. 59, 80-82 (2003).
75. See id. at 292, 576 S.E.2d at 759.
76. Id. at 283, 576 S.E.2d at 753.
77. Id. at 283-84, 576 S.E.2d at 753.
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basis directly by Dominion, the parties subsequently entered into
a series of contracts whereby Stihl contracted with a broker,
ACSYS Information Technology, Inc., which in turn contracted
with Dominion for Williams's services.7" As Williams's initial as-
signment was ending, he discovered that Stihl was contemplating
another project that would likely require his services.79 He also
discovered the extent to which his services were being marked up
by Dominion and ACSYS. ° In combination with ACSYS, Wil-
liams arranged to be retained by Stihl after completion of his ini-
tial assignment, but without the participation of Dominion, and
then resigned his employment with Dominion.8 '
Dominion recovered a verdict on theories of breach of fiduciary
duty, interference with business relationships, and statutory con-
82spiracy. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the
trial court's action denying Williams's motion to strike and sub-
sequent motion to set aside the verdict.83 The court recognized
that an employee has a common law fiduciary duty of loyalty to
his employer that precludes, among other things, competition
with the employer during the term of his employment.84 Absent a
non-competition covenant, however, "an employee has the right to
make arrangements during his employment to compete with his
employer after resigning his post." 5 This right, according to the
court, "is not absolute" 6 and "'must be balanced with the impor-
tance of the integrity and fairness attaching to the relationship
between employer and employee."'8 7 Whether specific conduct un-
dertaken prior to resignation breaches the duty of loyalty "'re-
quires a case by case analysis.' 8
In this case, the court held that due to a number of factors,
principally the fact that the opportunity with Stihl was not se-
78. Id. at 284, 576 S.E.2d at 754.
79. Id. at 285, 576 S.E.2d at 754.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 285-87, 576 S.E.2d at 755.
82. Id. at 288, 576 S.E.2d at 756.
83. Id. at 292, 576 S.E.2d at 759.
84. Id. at 289, 576 S.E.2d at 757 (citing Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Richmond v.
DePew, 247 Va. 240, 249, 440 S.E.2d 918, 923 (1994); Home v. Holley, 167 Va. 234, 241,
188 S.E.2d 169, 172 (1936)).
85. Williams, 265 Va. at 289, 576 S.E.2d at 757.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting Feddeman & Co., 260 Va. at 42, 530 S.E.2d at 672).
88. Id.
2004]
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cret, that Williams completed his engagement, and that Williams
had not signed any sort of non-competition agreement with Do-
minion, he had not breached the duty of loyalty to Dominion.89
Moreover, the court held the opportunity with Stihl to be no more
than a "lead" and not a business expectancy.' Finally, since it
was the breach of the duty of loyalty that had provided the ele-
ment of malice supporting recovery under Virginia Code sections
18.2-499 and -500, the verdict on this count fell as well. 9' The
court was careful to note that where the employee had "'misap-
propriated trade secrets, misused confidential information, [or]
solicited an employer's clients or other employees prior to termi-
nation,"' breach of fiduciary duty will be found.92 Nonetheless,
Williams presents a roadmap for employees seeking to avoid the
Feddeman decision.
The Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the phrase "reputa-
tion, trade, business or profession" in Andrews v. Ring.9 ' In that
case, the Chairperson of the Grayson County School Board and
the Director of School Maintenance sued the Commonwealth's At-
torney and Building Official of the County arising out of the issu-
ance of criminal warrants under the Uniform Statewide Building
Code in connection with construction at Grayson County High
School. 94 The trial court granted summary judgment to the defen-
dants on the statutory conspiracy claim.95 On appeal, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia affirmed, holding that the word "reputa-
tion" in the statute, interpreted in the context of the words "trade,
business or profession," which follow it, does not include damage
to personal reputation.96 More importantly, in this case, the al-
leged damage to reputation had occurred in the context of the
plaintiffs' employment.97 Nonetheless, the court held that the
statute did not cover "employment interests."98
89. Id. at 291-92, 576 S.E.2d at 758-59.
90. Id. at 291, 576 S.E.2d at 758.
91. Id. at 292, 576 S.E.2d at 759.
92. Id. at 291, 576 S.E.2d at 758 (quoting Feddeman & Co., 260 Va. at 42, 530 S.E.2d
at 672).
93. 266 Va. 311, 316, 585 S.E.2d 780, 782 (2003).
94. Id. at 316-17, 585 S.E.2d at 782-83.
95. Id. at 318, 585 S.E.2d at 783.
96. Id. at 319, 585 S.E.2d at 784.
97. Id.
98. See id. The court noted that the federal courts in Virginia had already reached
this conclusion in Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1259 (4th Cir. 1985) and in Nationwide
[Vol. 39:87
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The Andrews opinion also includes an interesting discussion of
immunity as to the plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claims.99 The
Commonwealth's Attorney was held to be clothed with absolute
judicial immunity from suit on the basis that bringing criminal
charges is an essential prerequisite of the process of adjudicating
them.' 0 The Building Official claimed "quasi-judicial immunity"
on the basis that he functioned as a prosecutor in enforcing the
Uniform Statewide Building Code. 1' The court agreed that such
immunity exists, stating: "[wie have recognized that quasi-
judicial immunity may extend to certain non-judicial public offi-
cials acting within their jurisdiction, in good faith, and while per-
forming judicial functions."10 2 The court concluded, however, that
the Building Official's role was more closely akin to that of a po-
lice officer than a prosecutor.0 3 While absolute immunity was de-
nied,0 4 the Building Official may have been entitled to qualified
immunity similar to that of a police officer." 5 The burden of es-
tablishing entitlement to qualified immunity, which entails a
showing of good faith and probable cause, rests on the party as-
serting immunity.106 Under the facts presented in this appeal, the
Building Official had not met this burden.10 7 Thus, as to one of
the plaintiffs, the trial court's summary judgment order was re-
versed and the matter remanded for trial. 08
VI. NONSUIT
In the first of five decisions involving nonsuits, the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Wilby v. Gostell°9 held that a plaintiff could
nonsuit all claims notwithstanding the entry of partial summary
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Jones, 577 F. Supp. 968, 970 (W.D. Va. 1984).
99. Andrews, 266 Va. at 320-21, 585 S.E.2d at 784-85.
100. Id. at 321, 585 S.E.2d at 785.
101. Id. at 325, 585 S.E.2d at 787.
102. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 787-88 (citing Harlow v. Clatterbuck, 230 Va. 490, 493, 339
S.E.2d 181, 184 (1986)).
103. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 788.
104. Id. at 325-26, 585 S.E.2d at 788.
105. Id. at 326, 585 S.E.2d at 788.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 327, 585 S.E.2d at 788-89.
109. 265 Va. 437, 578 S.E.2d 796 (2003).
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judgment on the issue of contributory negligence."' In a prior de-
cision, Dalloul v. Agbey,"' the court had interpreted Virginia
Code section 8.01-380 to disallow nonsuits of individual counts or
claims as to which an interlocutory dispositive ruling had been
rendered." 2 In Wilby, the plaintiff had combined her claims of
negligence and willful and wanton conduct into a single count.11 3
Thus, although the trial court entered a partial summary judg-
ment order that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence, this order did not result in the dismissal of any count of
her motion for judgment."' Rather, the court characterized the
trial court's ruling as an in limine determination that the plain-
tiffs burden of proof would be "to establish willful and wanton
conduct.""' Since all claims were still pending, they could be non-
suited under Virginia Code section 8.01-380.116
Another nonsuit decision decided on the same day, Simon v.
Forer,"7 is of even greater application. The tolling provision of
Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3) provides that the time per-
mitted for refiling a nonsuited action shall be the greater of six
months or "the original period of limitation.""' Prior to this deci-
sion, there was substantial room for debate as to whether in cal-
110. Id. at 446, 578 S.E.2d at 801.
111. 255 Va. 511, 499 S.E.2d 279 (1998).
112. Id. at 514, 499 S.E.2d at 281. Dalloul involved a seven-count motion for judgment
as to which the trial court had dismissed Counts III through VII prior to the nonsuit. Id.
at 512-13, 499 S.E.2d at 280. The court held that these counts had been submitted for de-
cision, which, under Virginia Code section 8.01-380, terminates the right to take a nonsuit.
Id. at 514, 499 S.E.2d at 281 (referring to VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp.
2004)). Thus, the plaintiffs nonsuit was held to apply only to the claims remaining in the
case at the time of the nonsuit, Counts I and II. Id. at 515, 499 S.E.2d at 282. The nonsuit
rendered the decision on Counts III through VI an appealable final order, and upon the
plaintiffs failure to appeal these counts, they became res judicata. Id. at 514, 499 S.E.2d
at 281.
113. Wilby, 265 Va. at 441, 578 S.E.2d at 798.
114. See id. at 443, 578 S.E.2d at 799. Under Wolfe v. Baube, 241 Va. 462, 465, 403
S.E.2d 338, 339 (1991), contributory negligence is not a defense to actions for willful and
wanton conduct, unless the plaintiffs conduct is similarly willful and wanton.
115. Wilby, 265 Va. at 446, 578 S.E.2d at 801.
116. See id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004). Justice Kinser filed a
dissenting opinion in which she characterized the claims for simple negligence and willful
and wanton conduct as separate claims that could have been brought in separate counts,
in which case Dalloul would clearly have applied to the count for simple negligence. See
Wilby, 265 Va. at 447-49, 578 S.E.2d at 801-03 (Kinser, J., dissenting). The failure of the
majority to bar relitigation of this claim "places form over substance." Id. at 448, 578
S.E.2d at 802 (Kinser, J., dissenting).
117. 265 Va. 483, 578 S.E.2d 792 (2003).
118. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
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culating the "original period of limitation," the statute of limita-
tion was considered tolled while the nonsuited action was pend-
ing. The statute provides that as to all dismissals without preju-
dice other than by nonsuit, "the time such action is pending shall
not be computed as part of the [limitations] period."119 As to non-
suits, the statute states that "the statute of limitations with re-
spect to such action shall be tolled by the commencement of the
nonsuited action" and then provides for refiling within six months
or the "original period of limitation."2 ° Many interpreted the "toll-
ing" language of Virginia Code subsection (E)(3) as a reference to
the above quoted language from subsection (E)(1), such that the
time during which the nonsuited action was pending should "not
be computed." 2' Thus, the treatment of nonsuits would be the
same as other dismissals without prejudice, except that the plain-
tiffs nonsuiting actions would be guaranteed a minimum of six
months from the date of nonsuit in which to refile. The Court in
Simon emphatically rejected this approach and held that the
"'original period of limitation"' should be calculated from the date
of accrual without interruption, as if the nonsuited action had
never been brought.'22
In Atkins v. Rice,'2' the Supreme Court of Virginia revisited the
"submitted... for decision" language of Virginia Code section
8.01-380(A). 24 In that case, the plaintiff had failed to serve her
suit within one year of filing.125 The defendant entered a special
appearance and filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of un-
timely service.12' At the hearing on the defendant's motion to
dismiss, the plaintiffs counsel argued that due diligence had been
undertaken to effect timely service and that the court should
deny the motion or "in the alternative at least permit us to take a
nonsuit."'2 ' The trial judge twice confirmed that the plaintiff was
119. Id. § 8.01-229(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
120. Id. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
121. Id. § 8.01-229(E)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
122. Simon, 265 Va. at 491, 578 S.E.2d at 796.
123. 266 Va. 328, 585 S.E.2d 550 (2003).
124. Id. at 331, 585 S.E.2d at 551 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp.
2004)).
125. Id. at 330, 585 S.E.2d at 551. Rule 3:3 requires that service be made within one
year of filing unless the court finds that the plaintiff exercised "due diligence" to effect
timely service. VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:3 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
126. Atkins, 266 Va. at 330, 585 S.E.2d at 551.
127. Id.
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not taking a nonsuit by this comment. 2 ' The defense counsel then
presented rebuttal argument.'29 At the conclusion of argument,
the trial judge commenced ruling on the motion, stating, "I sym-
pathize with your frustration but," at which point the plaintiffs
counsel interrupted by taking a nonsuit.3 °
The trial court ruled, based upon Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co.
v. DePew,'3' that "a party may nonsuit even during the trial
court's comments in anticipation of its ruling on a motion to
strike so long as the ruling has not yet been made."'32 In Hilb, in-
volving remarkably similar facts, the Supreme Court of Virginia
had held a nonsuit taken while the trial judge was announcing
the ruling on a motion to strike timely.133 The motion in Atkins,
however, was not a motion to strike but a motion to dismiss.
134
This proved to be a critical difference. Virginia Code section 8.01-
380(A) permits a nonsuit to be taken at any time "before a motion
to strike the evidence has been sustained or before the jury re-
tires from the bar or before the action has been submitted to the
court for decision." 3 ' The operative language was not "motion to
strike... has been sustained" but "submitted to the court for de-
cision. "136 In Atkins, while the motion to dismiss had not been
ruled upon, it had clearly been "submitted for decision" and, in
fact, the trial court was in the process of ruling on the motion.
37
On this basis, the trial court's action permitting the nonsuit was
held to be in error.
38
In Phipps v. Liddle, 39 the Supreme Court of Virginia inter-
preted the requirement of Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3)
that a nonsuited action be re-filed within six months of "the order
entered by the court."4 ° Phipps appealed the nonsuit of his per-
128. Id.
129. Id. at 330-31, 585 S.E.2d at 551.
130. Id.
131. 247 Va. 240, 440 S.E.2d 918 (1994).
132. Atkins, 266 Va. at 331, 585 S.E.2d at 551.
133. Hilb, 247 Va. at 245, 440 S.E.2d at 921.
134. Atkins, 266 Va. at 330, 585 S.E.2d at 551.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
136. Id.
137. See Atkins, 266 Va. at 330-31, 585 S.E.2d at 551.
138. Id. at 332, 585 S.E.2d at 552.
139. 267 Va. 344, 593 S.E.2d 193 (2004).
140. Id. at 346-47, 593 S.E.2d at 194 (interpreting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3)
(Cum. Supp. 2004)).
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sonal injury action to the Supreme Court of Virginia.1 4 ' He re-
filed the action within six months of the court's mandate affirm-
ing the trial court's decision granting the nonsuit. 142 The trial
court sustained Liddle's special plea, however, on the basis that
Phipps had failed to refile within six months of the trial court's
nonsuit order in the original action.14 1 Citing Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-685, which requires the Supreme Court of Virginia's
mandate to be entered by the trial court "as its own,"'" the deci-
sion of the trial court was reversed. 1
45
Finally, the Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the "sub-
mitted for decision" language of Virginia Code section 8.01-380 in
the context of a confession of judgment in AAA Disposal Services,
Inc. v. Eckert.141 In that case, Eckert sought $60,000 in damages
for injuries allegedly sustained in an automobile accident.147 More
than two months before trial, he moved to amend his ad damnum
to $350,000.148 This motion was denied as untimely and the de-
fendants, who had admitted liability, responded by filing a con-
fession of judgment pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-431 in
the clerk's office in the full amount of the plaintiffs ad dam-
num.149 The following day, Eckert filed a motion to nonsuit the
case. 5 ° The defendants opposed the nonsuit on the basis that
their confession of judgment in the full amount of the plaintiffs
ad damnum "effectively ended the case."' 5' The plaintiffs right to
nonsuit had, therefore, been terminated pursuant to the "submit-
ted for decision" language of Virginia Code section 8.01-380.152
The trial court nonetheless permitted the nonsuit, citing to the
requirement of Virginia Code section 8.01-432 that a defendant
may confess judgment "'for only such principal and interest as
[the] creditor may be willing to accept a judgment for."1 53 Since
141. Id. at 345, 593 S.E.2d at 194.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 345-46, 593 S.E.2d at 194.
144. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-685 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
145. Phipps, 267 Va. at 346-47, 593 S.E.2d at 195.
146. 267 Va. 442, 593 S.E.2d 260 (2004).
147. Id. at 444, 593 S.E.2d at 261.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 261-62.
151. Id. at 444-45, 593 S.E.2d at 262.
152. See id. at 445, 593 S.E.2d at 262.
153. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-432 (Repl. Vol. 2000)).
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the plaintiff had not accepted the confession of judgment, it was
ineffective and did not constitute submitting the case for deci-
sion.1"4 The defendants argued that since the plaintiff could not
recover more than the ad damnum, such consent was implied. 5 '
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed and affirmed the trial
court's order permitting the nonsuit.'56
VII. RELIEF FROM ADMISSIONS
Rule 4:11(a) of the Supreme Court of Virginia provides that re-
quests for admissions are deemed admitted unless either objected
to or denied within twenty-one days of service.'57 Matters which
are admitted under Rule 4:11 are "conclusively established"
unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of
the admission under Rule 4:11(b). 5 ' In Shaheen v. County of
Mathews,'59 the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the circum-
stances under which a trial court should permit relief from ad-
missions."'
The county alleged that the Shaheen's predecessor in title had
filed a petition in 1896 that had established the Auburn Public
Boat Landing on the North River; the county claimed ownership
of the landing.'6 ' During discovery, the Shaheens had propounded
two sets of requests for admissions, including one that the county
admit that there was no reference in the county land records to
the suit or the county's interest in the road and boat landing.162
The county failed to timely respond to either set of admissions. 63
Over a month after the Shaheens filed the second set of requests,
the county sought leave to file late answers to the Shaheens' ad-
mission requests."6 The trial court granted relief from the admis-
sions under Rule 4:11(b), holding that otherwise the county had
154. See id.
155. Id. at 446, 593 S.E.2d at 262.
156. Id. at 446-47, 593 S.E.2d at 263.
157. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:11(a).
158. Id. at 4:11(b).
159. 265 Va. 462, 579 S.E.2d 162 (2003).
160. Id. at 465, 579 S.E.2d at 165.
161. Id. at 466, 468, 579 S.E.2d at 165-66.
162. Id. at 470, 474, 579 S.E.2d at 167, 170.
163. Id. at 470, 579 S.E.2d at 167.
164. Id.
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"'admit[ted] away the case."'165 The court then continued the case
for approximately eight months in order to allow the parties addi-
tional time to prepare for trial in light of its rulings on the
county's motion.166 At trial, the court determined that the county
had established an easement for the road and boat landing.'67
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a "two-part
test" based on federal decisions under Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 36(b), which contains language identical to Virginia Su-
preme Court Rule 4:11(b) regarding relief from admissions. 168
Under this test, the court's discretion to grant relief must be ex-
ercised: "'(1) when the presentation of the merits of the action will
be subserved thereby[;]' and (2) 'the party who obtained the ad-
mission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment
will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the
merits.", 69 As to the former element, the court agreed that refusal
to grant relief from the admissions would result in the county
"admitting away the case."170 Regarding the element of prejudice,
the supreme court held:
This prejudice has been described as "not simply that the party who
initially obtained the admission will now have to convince the fact
finder of its truth. Rather, it relates to the difficulty a party may face
in proving its case, e.g., caused by the unavailability of key wit-
nesses, because of the sudden need to obtain evidence with respect to
the questions previously answered by the admissions."
1 71
The Shaheens did not, and could not, demonstrate this type of
prejudice. 2 In fact, the admissions appeared to relate primarily
to matters of record as to which the Shaheens produced two ex-
pert witnesses at trial.7 3 They instead focused on the lateness of
the county's responses and on the unfairness of granting relief
from admissions less than forty-eight hours before trial. 74 The
165. Id. at 471, 474, 579 S.E.2d at 168, 170.
166. Id. at 471, 579 S.E.2d at 168.
167. Id. at 472, 579 S.E.2d at 168.
168. Id. at 473, 475 n.6, 579 S.E.2d at 169 & n.6.
169. Id. at 473, 579 S.E.2d at 169 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:11(b) (Repl. Vol. 2004)).
170. Id. at 474, 579 S.E.2d at 170.
171. Id. (quoting Brook Village N. Assocs. v. General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir.
1982)).
172. Id. at 475, 579 S.E.2d at 170.
173. Id. at 468, 579 S.E.2d at 166.
174. Id. at 475, 579 S.E.2d at 170.
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supreme court found these considerations immaterial in view of
the continuance granted by the trial court.175
Importantly, one of the Shaheens' arguments was that "the
County did not offer any reason or excuse for its tardiness."'76
Nowhere in the decision is there any discussion of this argument.
Although the opinion contains a detailed factual recitation, it
does not appear that the county offered any justification for fail-
ing to timely respond to the admissions or its delay in seeking re-
lief under Rule 4:11(b). If the county did attempt to do so, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia did not appear to regard it as material to
its decision. The omission of any requirement of showing of "ex-
cusable neglect"'77 in the opinion is perhaps its most significant
feature. Instead, under Shaheen and the "two-part test" of Rule
4:11(b), a showing that relief will promote a decision of the case
on the merits, coupled with the inability of the opposing party to
demonstrate prejudice, is all that is required. 11
VIII. RELIEF FROM ARBITRATION AWARD
Lackman v. Long & Foster Real Estate, Inc.'79 involved a dis-
puted real estate commission. 8 ° The parties had agreed to arbi-
trate any disputes, and a panel of arbitrators had returned a de-
cision favorable to Long & Foster.' Relief from arbitration
awards is governed by Virginia Code section 8.01-581.010, which
provides:
Upon application of a party, the court shall vacate an award where:
1. The award was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue
means;
2. There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neu-
tral, corruption in any of the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing
the rights of any party;
3. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
175. See id.
176. Id. at 472, 579 S.E.2d at 169.
177. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b).
178. See Shaheen, 265 Va. at 475, 579 S.E.2d at 170.
179. 266 Va. 20, 580 S.E.2d 818 (2003).
180. See id. at 22, 580 S.E.2d at 820.
181. Id.
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4. The arbitrators refused to... hear evidence material to the con-
troversy or otherwise so conducted the hearing.., in such a way as
to substantially prejudice the rights of a party .... 182
Lackman sued for relief from the arbitration award. 8 3 In addi-
tion to asserting several of the grounds listed in the statute, he
maintained that the arbitrators had simply misconstrued the con-
trolling brokerage contract"8 4 and invoked the court's general eq-
uitable powers in seeking relief from the arbitration award. 8 He
asserted that Virginia Code section 8.01-581.010 was unconstitu-
tional because it allows arbiters to ignore the contract between
the parties.
The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the constitutionality of
the statute, citing the fact that parties must agree to arbitrate
their disputes.8 6 This agreement was deemed to include consent
to Virginia Code section 8.01-581.010's provisions regarding en-
forcement of the resulting award.8 7 The court also rejected
Lackman's attempt to obtain equitable relief from the arbitration
award, holding that the statute provided the exclusive basis for
such relief.18 In this regard, the court noted that the predecessor
to the current statute, Virginia Code section 8.01-580, had spe-
cifically provided that it "'shall not be construed to take away the
power of courts of equity over awards. 18 9 This language was de-
leted in adopting Virginia Code section 8.01-581.010, which the
court interpreted to terminate the power of the courts to set aside
awards on general equitable principles and render the statute the
exclusive basis for obtaining relief from arbitration awards. 90 Fi-
nally, the court held that the evidence failed to support Lack-
182. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.010 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
183. Lackman, 266 Va. at 22, 580 S.E.2d at 820.
184. Id. at 22-23, 24, 580 S.E.2d at 820-21.
185. Id. at 23, 580 S.E.2d at 820.
186. Id. at 25, 580 S.E.2d at 822.
187. See id.
188. Id. at 26, 580 S.E.2d at 822. This situation is in contrast to Virginia Code section
8.01-428 regarding relief from judgments generally. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428 (Repl.
Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004). In Charles v. Precision Tune, Inc., 243 Va. 313, 414 S.E.2d
831 (1992), the Supreme Court of Virginia reaffirmed the continued ability of courts to
grant relief from judgments under general equitable powers. Id. at 317, 414 S.E.2d at 833.
189. Lackman, 266 Va. at 26, 580 S.E.2d at 822.
190. Id. Compare this result to Virginia Code section 8.01-428(D) which provides: "This
section does not limit the power of the court to entertain at any time an independent ac-
tion to relieve a party from any judgment or proceeding... ."VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428(D)
(Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
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man's allegations as to fraud, partiality, and procedural errors
and upheld the award.191
IX. VARIANCE
It is a fundamental proposition that there must be identity be-
tween the pleadings, proof, and the resulting judgment or de-
cree.'92 This proposition is aptly illustrated by the recent case of
Jenkins v. Bay House Associates, 19 3 which involved the ownership
of a pond opening to the Chesapeake Bay.' Bay House Associ-
ates asserted exclusive ownership and sought to enjoin adjacent
landowners from erecting piers extending into the pond."9 5 The
adjacent owners asserted that once the opening was created join-
ing the waters of the pond with the Chesapeake Bay, they ac-
quired riparian rights to use the pond.'96 The trial court sustained
Bay Associates' position and enjoined the defendants from erect-
ing piers or otherwise using the pond.1 97 On appeal, however, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that Bay House Associates' plead-
ings had asserted ownership only in the land beneath the pond
and not in the water which comprised the pond. 9 ' Thus, while it
affirmed the trial court's adjudication of the underlying title dis-
pute, it reversed the entry of an injunction as to use of the
pond.'99 Instead, the injunction should have prohibited only tres-
passing on the land under the pond, consistent with the allega-
tions and prayer for relief in the Bill of Complaint.2"0 In so hold-
ing, the court stated: "[a] litigant's pleadings are as essential as
his proof, and a court may not award particular relief unless it is
substantially in accord with the case asserted in those plead-
"1201ings.
191. See Lackman, 266 Va. at 26, 580 S.E.2d at 822.
192. See, e.g., Ted Lansing Supply Co. v. Royal Aluminum & Constr. Corp., 221 Va.
1139, 1141, 277 S.E.2d 228, 229 (1981) (reversing judgment where there was a variance
between the legal theory asserted in the motion for judgment and the jury instructions).
193. 266 Va. 39, 581 S.E.2d 510 (2003).
194. Id. at 41, 581 S.E.2d at 511.
195. Id. at 41-42, 581 S.E.2d at 511.
196. Id. at 42, 581 S.E.2d at 512.
197. Id. at 42-43, 581 S.E.2d at 512.
198. Id. at 44, 581 S.E.2d at 512-13.
199. Id. at 45, 581 S.E.2d at 513.
200. See id. at 44, 581 S.E.2d at 513.
201. Id. at 43, 581 S.E.2d at 512.
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What gives the foregoing statement particular significance is
that Jenkins was a chancery proceeding. Unlike the rule at law
which limits the ability of the court to grant judgment in excess of
the ad damnum,2° once the court's general equitable powers have
been properly invoked, it is not limited to the specific equitable
relief sought by the plaintiff.2"3 Bay House Associates asserted
that, although it had not specifically sought that portion of the in-
junction related to use of the waters comprising the pond, it was
within the court's general equitable powers to grant it.2"4 The Su-
preme Court of Virginia disagreed20 5 and provided the following
guidance:
When a party prays for both special and general relief and no relief
may be granted under the special prayer, a court of equity may grant
proper relief under the general prayer that is consistent with the
case stated in the bill of complaint.... However, a general prayer
will support relief only for those matters placed in controversy by the
pleadings and, thus, any relief granted must be supported by allega-
tions of material facts in the pleadings that will sustain such relief.
This rule reflects the principle that although the power of an equity
court is broad, that power does not permit a court to adjudicate
claims that the parties have not asserted.20 6
X. WRONGFUL DEATH
Fowler v. Winchester Medical Center, Inc.207 interpreted and
applied the statute of limitations applicable to wrongful death
suits. 28 Under Virginia Code section 8.01-244, these suits must
be brought within two years of the decedent's death.20 9 Subsection
(B) provides that the limitations period is tolled when a suit has
been timely brought, but abates other than by nonsuit without an
adjudication on the merits.210 In this case, the decedent's widow
202. See Powell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 231 Va. 464, 469, 344 S.E.2d 916, 919 (1986).
203. Jenkins, 266 Va. at 44-45, 581 S.E.2d at 513.
204. Id. at 43, 581 S.E.2d at 512.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 44-45, 581 S.E.2d at 513 (citations omitted).
207. 266 Va. 131, 580 S.E.2d 816 (2003).
208. Id. at 133, 580 S.E.2d at 817.
209. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-244(A) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
210. Id. § 8.01-244(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004). Nonsuits of wrongful death
cases are governed by Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
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had qualified as administrator of his estate in West Virginia."
After administration of the West Virginia estate was complete
and without qualifying in Virginia, she filed this action for wrong-
ful death.212 After the expiration of the two year limitations pe-
riod, defendants challenged her standing.2 13 Fowler responded by
attempting to nonsuit in order to qualify and refile. 24 The trial
judge refused to permit the nonsuit and the action was dismissed
with prejudice.215
In this regard, Fowler could cite McDaniel v. North Carolina
Pulp Co.216 in which the Supreme Court of Virginia held the stat-
ute of limitations to be tolled by the filing of a wrongful death suit
by a personal representative who was qualified in Nevada, but
had not qualified in Virginia.217 In McDaniel, the nonsuit was
permitted.2"' A few months later the plaintiff refiled the case,
joined by a co-plaintiff who was a resident of Virginia and had re-
cently qualified as the decedent's personal representative in the
Commonwealth. 21 '9 Notwithstanding the lack of proper qualifica-
tion in Virginia, McDaniel had been held the "real party in inter-
est" and, as such, was entitled to nonsuit and to take advantage
of Virginia Code section 8.01-244(B)'s tolling provision. 220 The
plaintiff in Fowler, however, was not qualified in West Virginia or
Virginia at the time the suit was filed.221 On this basis, the court
distinguished McDaniel and affirmed the trial judge's refusal to
permit the nonsuit.222
XI. IMPROPER ARGUMENT
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the subject of im-
proper jury argument in Velocity Express Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v.
211. Fowler, 266 Va. at 132, 580 S.E.2d at 816.
212. Id. at 133, 580 S.E.2d at 816.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id., 580 S.E.2d at 816-17.
216. 198 Va. 612, 95 S.E.2d 201 (1956).
217. Id. at 619-20, 95 S.E.2d at 207.
218. Id. at 614, 95 S.E.2d at 203.
219. Id. at 619, 95 S.E.2d at 206.
220. Id. at 619-20, 95 S.E.2d at 206-07.
221. Fowler, 266 Va. at 134, 580 S.E.2d at 817.
222. Id. at 136, 580 S.E.2d at 818.
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Hugen.223 In that case, Hugen suffered catastrophic injuries as a
result of a collision with a van operated by an employee of Veloc-
ity Express. 2 4 Both parties agreed that Hugen was permanently
disabled and would require around-the-clock assistance for the
balance of his life.225 Hugen contended that his injuries required
the services of a licensed practical nurse, at a cost of approxi-
mately $17 million over his remaining life expectancy.226 Velocity
Express' expert testified that a certified nursing aide would be
capable of providing appropriate care at a lower cost of $4 mil-
lion.22 7 During closing argument, Hugen's counsel made several
arguments which were objected to by defense counsel. 22' The jury
returned a verdict of $60 million in favor of Hugen. 2 9 Velocity
Express moved for a mistrial, which the trial judge denied.23 °
At one point, Hugen's counsel suggested to the jury that it
should award damages that would permit Hugen to procure the
services of the more expensive licensed practical nurse, because
wealthy persons such as Howard Hughes or Bill Gates would do
so if similarly injured.231 The Supreme Court of Virginia held that
the trial judge erred in overruling the defendant's objection to
this and other comments and in denying its motion for a mistrial,
stating:
This argument was improper because plaintiffs counsel asked the
jury to award damages based upon irrelevant economic considera-
tions that are not part of the record in this case. The above-
referenced portion of plaintiffs closing argument asked the jury to
award damages to the plaintiff so that he could afford the same qual-
ity of medical care and treatment that the world's richest individuals
might purchase for themselves. The law of this Commonwealth,
however, only requires that a jury award plaintiff compensatory
damages that will fairly compensate him for his injuries proximately
caused by defendant's negligence.
232
Hugen's counsel also repeatedly suggested to the jury that they
223. 266 Va. 188, 585 S.E.2d 557 (2003).
224. Id. at 191, 585 S.E.2d at 559.
225. See id. at 192, 585 S.E.2d at 559-60.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 192, 585 S.E.2d at 560.
228. Id. at 194-97, 585 S.E.2d at 561-62.
229. Id. at 192, 585 S.E.2d at 560.
230. Id. at 197, 585 S.E.2d at 562.
231. Id. at 195, 585 S.E.2d at 561.
232. Id. at 200-01, 585 S.E.2d at 564.
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place themselves in the place of Hugen or his wife.233 For exam-
ple, the plaintiffs counsel at one point argued: "'Suppose your
husband were choking to death and he couldn't open his mouth?
Do you want an aide trying to get your husband's throat clear or
would you like to have a nurse... ",,234 The trial court admonished
that "'it is not appropriate to ask the jurors to put themselves in
the place of the party."'235 The supreme court ruled that, given the
plaintiffs counsel's repeated violations of the prohibition on in-
voking the "Golden Rule," the trial judge's admonition to Hugen's
lawyer was insufficient to avoid prejudice.236 Since liability was
relatively clear and the improper argument went to the issue of
damages only, however, the matter was remanded for a new trial
on this issue alone.237
XlI. REQUIREMENT OF CONTEMPORANEOUS OBJECTION
Rule 5A: 18238 applicable to the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
and Rule 5:25239 applicable to the Supreme Court of Virginia, both
require that the appellant make a contemporaneous objection to
the trial court in order to preserve the ability to appeal. Williams
v. Gloucester Sheriffs Department24 ° involved an appeal from a
decision by the Worker's Compensation Commission.24' Williams
claimed he had developed heart disease due to his employment by
the Gloucester County Sheriffs Department.242 His claim had
been initially denied by a deputy commissioner.24 3 On appeal, the
full Commission affirmed the denial of Williams's claim; its deci-
sion, however, was based on a determination that his last "injuri-
ous exposure" occurred while employed elsewhere.2"
The court of appeals refused Williams's appeal on the grounds
233. See id. at 196, 585 S.E.2d at 561-62.
234. Id. at 196, 585 S.E.2d at 562. Similar arguments were made repeatedly by plain-
tiff's counsel during closing argument. See id. at 196-97, 585 S.E.2d at 562.
235. Id. at 196, 585 S.E.2d at 562.
236. Id. at 202, 585 S.E.2d at 565.
237. Id. at 203, 585 S.E.2d at 566.
238. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:18 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
239. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5A:25 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
240. 266 Va. 409, 587 S.E.2d 546 (2003).
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that he had failed to make a contemporaneous objection to this
ruling, as required by Rule 5A:18.245 Williams contended that
there was no opportunity to make such an objection, as "the basis
for the Commission's decision was not raised, litigated, or in any
way considered as an issue in the case prior to the issuance of the
Commission's decision."2 46 The Supreme Court of Virginia held
that, notwithstanding this fact, Williams could have brought his
arguments before the Commission in a motion for reconsideration
and that his failure to do so barred his appeal.2 47
XIII. ACTIONS BROUGHT BY MINORS
Virginia Code section 8.01-8 provides that actions on behalf of
a minor should be brought by "his next friend."248 In Herndon v.
St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. ,249 the action on behalf of the injured mi-
nor was brought by "'Debbie Thompson Herndon, as mother and
next friend of Matthew McNeil Herndon.' 250 St. Mary's moved to
dismiss on the grounds that the action had not been brought in
Matthew's own name by his "next friend."251 It was undisputedly
the requirement at common law that the action be initiated in the
minor's name by his "next friend," rather than in the name of the
"next friend."252 Herndon pointed to language added to the statute
in 1998 that "[e]ither or both parents may sue on behalf of a mi-
nor as his next friend,"253 and argued that this language altered
the common law rule.254 The Supreme Court of Virginia held this
language to be ambiguous; but, based upon the rule of construc-
tion that "a statutory provision will not be held to change the
245. Id., 587 S.E.2d at 548.
246. Id. at 411, 587 S.E.2d at 548.
247. Id. at 411-12, 587 S.E.2d at 548. For additional discussion of Williams, see Law-
rence D. Tarr & Salvatore Lupica, Annual Survey of Virginia Law: Worker's Compensa-
tion, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 475, 506-07 (2004).
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-8 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
249. 266 Va. 472, 587 S.E.2d 567 (2003).
250. Id. at 474, 587 S.E.2d at 568.
251. Id.
252. See Kirby v. Gilliam, 182 Va. 111, 116, 28 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1943).
253. Act of Apr. 12, 1998, ch. 402, 1998 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-8
(Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004)).
254. Herndon, 266 Va. at 475, 587 S.E.2d at 569.
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common law unless the legislative intent to do so is plainly mani-
fested," it affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the action.2 55
XIV. SETTING ASIDE DEFAULT JUDGMENT
Ryland v. Manor Care, Inc.256 involved an action seeking equi-
table relief from a default judgment pursuant to Virginia Code
section 8.01-428(D)," 7 which sets forth various statutory grounds
for relief from judgments.258 Subsection (D) preserves the power of
courts to grant equitable relief from judgments.259 In this case,
Manor Care timely notified its insurer of service of the plaintiffs
action.260 The insurer encountered difficulty in engaging the de-
fense counsel, with the first counsel engaged resigning when the
insurer was put in receivership and the second counsel discover-
ing a conflict after accepting the engagement.261 The insurer fi-
nally engaged the defense counsel; by this time, however, default
judgment had been entered.262 Manor Care sought to have the de-
fault reconsidered or set aside under the statute, and this relief
was granted by the trial court.263 Ryland then brought the subject
chancery proceeding seeking equitable relief.264
In Charles v. Precision Tune, Inc.,265 the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held the exercise of this power to be appropriate where the
following five factors are present:
(1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, to be
enforced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which
the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which pre-
vented the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of
255. Id. at 476-77, 587 S.E.2d at 569-70 (citing Linhart v. Lawson, 261 Va. 30, 35, 540
S.E.2d 875, 877 (2001)).
256. 266 Va. 503, 587 S.E.2d 515 (2003).
257. Id. at 505, 587 S.E.2d at 517.
258. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-428(D) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
259. Id.
260. Ryland, 266 Va. at 506, 587 S.E.2d at 517.
261. Id. at 506-08, 587 S.E.2d at 517-18.
262. Id. at 508, 587 S.E.2d at 518.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 509, 587 S.E.2d. 519.
265. 243 Va. 313, 414 S.E.2d 831 (1992).
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his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of the
defendant; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law. 26 6
In the subsequent case of Media General, Inc. v. Smith,267 the
Supreme Court of Virginia had expressly declined to adopt the
federal "excusable neglect" standard for relief from defaults.268
Importantly, in both of these cases, the court found equitable re-
lief inappropriate.269
The trial court in Ryland, citing primarily the first factor enu-
merated in Precision Tune, granted equitable relief from the de-
fault judgment.' On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia af-
firmed this decision.271 Its initial analysis focused on the absence
of specific findings on the other four elements of the Precision
Tune testy.27  Although it "stress[ed] that a trial court must articu-
late its findings with particularity regarding each of the five ele-
ments set forth in Precision Tune,"273 the court affirmed the trial
court on the basis that it "presume[d] that the court nonetheless
made the necessary findings since it set aside the default judg-
ment."274 The court then focused on the particular circumstances
presented under the "fraud, accident, or mistake" and "absence of
fault or negligence" prongs of the test.275 In particular, it cited the
ethical dilemma faced by the second defense counsel who discov-
ered a conflict after committing to the engagement.2 6 Before this
information could be communicated to the insurer and acted
upon, the time for filing responsive pleadings expired and default
judgment was entered.2 7 The court distinguished this situation
from a matter of inadvertence or neglect.278 The court also held
that Manor Care was free from fault because it justifiably relied
266. Id. at 317-18, 414 S.E.2d at 833.
267. 260 Va. 287, 534 S.E.2d 733 (2000).
268. Id. at 291, 587 S.E.2d at 735.
269. Id. at 291-92, 534 S.E.2d at 736; Precision Tune, 243 Va. at 318, 414 S.E.2d at
833.
270. See Ryland v. Manor Care, Inc., 266 Va. 503, 508-09, 587 S.E.2d 515, 518-19
(2003).
271. Id. at 512, 587 S.E.2d at 521.
272. Id. at 510, 587 S.E.2d at 519.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 509, 587 S.E.2d at 519.
275. Id. at 508-09, 587 S.E.2d 518-19.
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upon defense counsel's initial commitment to the engagement be-
fore discovery of the conflict. 9
Finally, the court discussed and distinguished its decision in
Media General."' In that case, all that had been shown was that
there was a system in place for responding to lawsuits and that
the system had failed.281 Conversely, in Ryland, Manor Care had
shown precisely why responsive pleadings had not been timely
filed, and that showing indicated no fault or negligence on its
part.28 2
XV. VIRGINIA TORT CLAIMS ACT
The Virginia Tort Claims Act 3 provides for a limited waiver of
the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth.2 4 In Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia v. Carter,8 5 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that the sovereign immunity of agencies of
the Commonwealth survived adoption of the Act.2 6 This case
arose from a medical malpractice action brought by Carter
against the University of Virginia and a resident physician in its
hospital.2 7 The Commonwealth, however, was not named as a de-
fendant in the suit.2 8 The physician asserted sovereign immunity
and was dismissed from the case.2"9 The trial court denied the
University's plea of sovereign immunity29 ° and this issue was cer-
tified to the Supreme Court of Virginia.291
Citing to the language of Virginia Code section 8.01-195.3 that
"the Commonwealth shall be liable for claims,"292 the Supreme
Court of Virginia held that this waiver of common law sovereign
279. Id. at 511, 587 S.E.2d at 520.
280. Id. at 511-12, 587 S.E.2d at 520.
281. Id. at 511, 587 S.E.2d at 520.
282. Id. at 511-12, 587 S.E.2d at 520.
283. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-195.1 to -195.9 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
284. Id. § 8.01-195.3 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
285. 267 Va. 242, 591 S.E.2d 76 (2004).
286. Id. at 246, 591 S.E.2d at 78-79.





292. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
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immunity did not extend to agencies of the Commonwealth.293
The court rejected Carter's argument based on Virginia Code sec-
tion 8.01-195.4 which provides that the Commonwealth "shall be
a proper party defendant."294 Carter pointed out that unless the
waiver of sovereign immunity applied to agencies of the Com-
monwealth, the only party that could be sued under the Act
would be the Commonwealth itself, thus making it a "necessary"
party and not merely a "proper" party.295 Carter also pointed to
the notice provision of Virginia Code section 8.01-195.6 which re-
quires the notice to identify "the agency or agencies alleged to be
liable."296 Nonetheless, the court ruled: "[i]f the General Assembly
desired in the Act to waive the sovereign immunity of the Com-
monwealth's agencies in addition to the immunity of the Com-
monwealth, it could have easily done so. It did not."297
The sufficiency of the plaintiffs notice of claim under Virginia
Code section 8.01-195.6 was at issue in Bates v. Common-
wealth,29 where the plaintiffs decedent died while a patient at
the University of Virginia Medical Center.299 In her notice of
claim, plaintiff identified the place of injury as "University of Vir-
ginia Health Sciences Center, Charlottesville, Virginia." 00 Vir-
ginia Code section 8.01-195.6 specifically requires that notice be
given to the Attorney General, "which includes the time and place
at which the injury is alleged to have occurred."30 ' Moreover, in
Halberstam v. Commonwealth,"2 the Supreme Court of Virginia
strictly construed this requirement and held that a notice specify-
ing the place of injury as "'the school parking lot"' at George Ma-
son University was insufficient on the basis that the University
had "'a number of parking lots and more than one campus.'"0 3 In
Bates, the Commonwealth argued that the University of Virginia
Medical Center similarly contains multiple buildings, floors, and
293. Carter, 267 Va. at 244, 591 S.E.2d at 77-78.
294. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.4 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
295. Carter, 267 Va. at 245, 591 S.E.2d at 78.
296. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.6 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
297. Id. at 246, 591 S.E.2d at 78-79.
298. 267 Va. 387, 593 S.E.2d 250 (2004).
299. Id. at 389-90, 593 S.E.2d at 252.
300. Id. at 390, 593 S.E.2d at 252.
301. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.6 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
302. 251 Va. 248, 467 S.E.2d 783 (1996).
303. Id. at 251, 467 S.E.2d at 785.
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rooms.3 4 The trial court agreed and based upon Halberstam dis-
missed the action.0 5
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the trial
court's decision." 6 In so doing, the court reaffirmed that the stat-
ute should be strictly construed and that Halberstam had been
correctly decided. 30 7 It stated, however, that the purpose of the
requirement of identifying the place of injury was to enable the
Commonwealth to undertake an investigation of the claim.308 On
the facts presented, it found that "[Virginia] code § 8.01-195.6
does not mandate that Bates was required to identify the floor or
room within the hospital at which the alleged injury to Banks oc-
curred because that degree of specificity was unnecessary to ac-
complish the purpose of the statute."30 9
The Supreme Court of Virginia interpreted the "legislative
function" exception to the Virginia Tort Claims Act, Virginia Code
section 8.01-195.3(2), in Maddox v. Commonwealth.31 ° Maddox, a
minor, was injured while riding his bicycle on a sidewalk in Ame-
lia, Virginia. 311 He alleged that the Commonwealth was negligent
in its design and maintenance of the sidewalk by allowing a
"'sharp and sudden drop off" to the adjacent land without a rail-
ing or other barrier. 2 He also alleged that by allowing the condi-
tion to persist, the Commonwealth was maintaining a nui-
sance.313 The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's plea of
sovereign immunity as to all claims.1 4 Maddox appealed only the
ruling on his nuisance claim. 15
Virginia Code section 8.01-195.3(2) excepts from the Tort
Claims Act's waiver of sovereign immunity "[a]ny claim based
upon an act or omission of the General Assembly ... or to the leg-
islative function of any agency subject to the provisions of this ar-
304. Bates, 267 Va. at 390-91, 593 S.E.2d at 252.
305. Id. at 391, 593 S.E.2d at 252.
306. Id. at 395, 593 S.E.2d at 255.
307. Id. at 394, 593 S.E.2d at 255.
308. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 254.
309. Id. at 394-95, 291 S.E.2d at 255.
310. 267 Va. 657, 594 S.E.2d 567 (2004).
311. 267 Va. at 660, 594 S.E.2d at 568.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 659, 594 S.E.2d at 658.
315. Id.
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ticle."316 Maddox argued that in this context, "legislative function"
was more limited than the term "governmental function," as used
in various sovereign immunity decisions, and should be inter-
preted as applying only to discretionary matters, such as setting
utility rates, drafting statutes, and promulgating rules." 7 Maddox
also cited to Taylor v. City of Charlottesville31 in which the Su-
preme Court of Virginia had held that a municipality could not
plead sovereign immunity in defense of a nuisance claim under
remarkably similar circumstances.319
The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed, holding that the de-
sign of streets, including adjacent sidewalks, is within the legisla-
tive power of the General Assembly.32 ° Although delegated to the
Commonwealth Transportation Commissioner and the Virginia
Department of Transportation, the design of roads retains its leg-
islative character.321 The court declined to distinguish nuisance
claims from negligence or other causes of action and limited the
application of Taylor to claims against municipalities and not "an
agent or instrumentality of the state."322 Accordingly, the trial
court's dismissal of the action was affirmed.323
XVI. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACT
At common law, a dispute could not be adjudicated unless there
was a cause of action "ripe" for decision. In the context of con-
tracts and other written instruments, this meant that one party
was forced to breach the obligation in order to be entitled to an
adjudication of rights.324 In Virginia Code section 8.01-184, the
316. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-195.3(2) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
317. Maddox, 267 Va. 662, 594 S.E.2d at 569.
318. 240 Va. 367, 397 S.E.2d 832 (1990).
319. Maddox, 267 Va. 662, 594 S.E.2d at 569. Taylor involved a claim that the city was
maintaining a nuisance by failing to install a barrier at the end of a road beyond which
was a steep precipice. Taylor, 240 Va. at 369-70, 372-74, 397 S.E.2d at 834-37.
320. Maddox, 267 Va. at 663-65, 594 S.E.2d at 570-71.
321. See id., at 665, 594 S.E.2d at 571.
322. Id. at 664-65, 594 S.E.2d at 570-71. In this regard, the court cited to its earlier
decision in Kellam v. School Board, 202 Va. 252, 117 S.E.2d 96 (1960), in which it had held
that a school board, as "an agent or instrumentality of the state" was immune from suit for
maintaining a nuisance. Id. at 258-59, 117 S.E.2d at 100.
323. Maddox, 267 Va. at 665, 594 S.E.2d at 571.
324. Cf. W. HAMILTON BRYSON, BRYSON ON VIRGINIA CIL PROCEDURE 477 (3d ed.
1997).
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General Assembly provided for the issuance of declaratory judg-
ments.325 This statute was not, however, intended to authorize
the issuance of mere "advisory opinions."326 Rather, it specifically
requires that there be an "actual controversy" between the par-
ties.327 In River Heights Associates v. Batten,328 the Supreme
Court of Virginia interpreted and applied this requirement.
River Heights involved the enforceability of covenants, dating
to 1959, restricting the use of certain lots fronting on Route 29 in
Albemarle County to "'residential purposes only."'329 At the time,
Route 29 was a two-lane road with residences and small busi-
nesses on both sides of the road.331 Presently, Route 29 is eight-to-
ten lanes wide in the vicinity of the property, with intense com-
mercial development on both sides of the road.331 No residential
uses had been implemented along Route 29 since 1959.332 More-
over, in 1969 when Albemarle County implemented its zoning or-
dinance, the subject property had been zoned B-i, a commercial
classification in which residential use is prohibited.333
The defendant argued that the declaratory judgment proceed-
ing was premature and that it had taken no "substantial steps"
toward developing the property in violation of the covenant, such
as the "expenditure of significant monies" or "the development of
specific plans."334 While agreeing that something more than
speculation is required, the court held that the plaintiffs pleading
did establish the existence of an "actual controversy." 35 In this
regard, the court pointed to the fact that the defendant had met
with residents in the subdivision and "'indicated that he intended
to commercially develop the properties at issue' and had engaged
an architect to prepare plans for this development.336
325. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
326. City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 229-30, 135 S.E.2d 773, 775-76 (1964).
327. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-184 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
328. 267 Va. 262, 591 S.E.2d 683 (2004).
329. Id. at 265, 266, 591 S.E.2d at 684, 685.
330. Id. at 267, 591 S.E.2d at 685.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 266, 591 S.E.2d at 685.
334. Id. at 268, 591 S.E.2d at 686.
335. Id. at 270, 591 S.E.2d at 687.
336. Id. at 269-70, 591 S.E.2d at 687.
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XVII. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
Gambrell v. City of Norfolk337 involved a "slip and fall" in a city
owned parking lot following a significant snowfall.33 The plaintiff
was an employee of Bank of America, which leased about 900 of
the 1,100 available spaces in the lot from the city at a rental rate
of $375,000 per year.339 Immediately following the snowfall, the
city closed the lot, reopening the lot two days later without plow-
ing it.34° The plaintiff was injured walking across the unplowed
lot to the shuttle bus stop.34' Witnesses for the city testified that
work crews had been plowing city streets around the clock since
the snowfall, but had not been able to plow the lot in question, as
there were secondary streets which remained to be cleared.342 The
trial court sustained the city's plea of sovereign immunity. 3
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the law of
sovereign immunity, which distinguishes between governmental
functions, to which immunity applies, and proprietary functions,
to which the municipality is liable for negligence on the same ba-
sis as a private party.344 A function is considered governmental "if
it is directly related to the general health, safety, and welfare of
the citizens."34 On the other hand, "a function is proprietary in
nature if it involves a privilege and power performed primarily
for the benefit of the municipality." 46 In particular, the court
stated that "routine maintenance or operation of a service being
provided by a municipality" is typically considered proprietary. 47
Interestingly, the court did not discuss at length Gambrell's as-
sertion that the overwhelmingly private use of the allegedly "pub-
lic" parking lot rendered the city's operation of the lot proprie-
tary. Instead, it focused on the city's snow removal efforts
337. 267 Va. 353, 593 S.E.2d 246 (2004).
338. Id. at 354, 593 S.E.2d at 247.
339. Id. at 355, 593 S.E.2d at 247.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 356, 593 S.E.2d at 248.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 357-59, 593 S.E.2d at 249-50.
345. Id. at 357, 593 S.E.2d at 249.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 357-58, 593 S.E.2d at 249.
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following the snowstorm.348 Citing prior cases holding that snow
removal was "an integral part of the governmental function of
rendering the city streets safe for public travel, " "' the court held
that sovereign immunity applied to bar the plaintiffs action.350
XVIII. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Shipman v. Kruck,35' the Supreme Court of Virginia inter-
preted and applied the "continuous representation rule" to an ac-
tion for legal malpractice.352 The Shipmans had engaged Kruck to
defend them in an action brought by one of their creditors.353 They
stated that their primary objective was to protect their residence
from creditors, which was held by Mr. Shipman as trustee pursu-
ant to a Declaration of Trust.354 Kruck incorrectly interpreted the
trust to be irrevocable and filed a bankruptcy petition on their
behalf on March 9, 1998."' 5 The bankruptcy trustee asserted that
the trust was revocable and should be included in the Shipmans'
bankruptcy estate.356 On January 19, 1999, Kruck withdrew as
counsel for the Shipmans.357 In subsequent proceedings, the
Bankruptcy Court held the trust revocable and ordered the prop-
erty sold to satisfy creditor claims.358 The Shipmans repurchased
the property from the bankruptcy trustee to prevent its sale to a
third party on June 29, 200 1. 359 The case dealt with the timeli-
ness of their motion for judgment against Kruck, filed on Sep-
tember 11, 2002.360
348. Id. at 359, 593 S.E.2d at 250.
349. Stanfield v. Peregoy, 245 Va. 339, 344, 429 S.E.2d 11, 13 (1993); see also Bialk v.
City of Hampton, 242 Va. 56, 59, 405 S.E.2d 619, 621 (1991).
350. Gambrell, 267 Va. 358-59, 593 S.E.2d at 249-50.
351. 267 Va. 495, 593 S.E.2d 319 (2004).
352. Id. at 502, 593 S.E.2d at 323.
353. Id. at 499, 593 S.E.2d at 320-21.




358. Id. at 499-500, 593 S.E.2d at 321.
359. Id. at 500, 593 S.E.2d at 321.
360. See id. The Shipmans initially filed suit on January 8, 2002, which, under the Su-
preme Court of Virginia's decision, would have been timely. Id. However, at the time the
bankruptcy was still pending, the cause of action against Kruck had not been abandoned
by the bankruptcy trustee. Id. Kruck challenged the Shipmans' standing and they elected
to nonsuit and seek abandonment by the bankruptcy trustee. Id. They refiled their action
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Kruck asserted that the cause of action accrued on March 9,
1998, when the bankruptcy petition was filed, subject to tolling
under the "continuous representation rule" until January 19,
1999, when he withdrew from the representation.36' The Ship-
mans contended that they incurred no damages, and thus their
cause of action did not mature until they repurchased their house
from the bankruptcy trustee on June 29, 2001.362 In this regard,
the Shipmans relied heavily on Allied Productions v. Duester-
dick,363 in which the Supreme Court of Virginia had held that an
action for legal malpractice was demurrable on the basis that the
plaintiff had not alleged payment of the default judgment suf-
fered due to alleged negligence of his counsel.3" The Supreme
Court of Virginia noted that it had addressed only the sufficiency
of the plaintiffs allegations of damages and not the statute of
limitations in Duesterdick.365 Nonetheless, it found the Duester-
dick decision contrary to longstanding precedent such as Housing
Authority v. Laburnum Construction Corp.366 and Virginia Mili-
tary Institute v. King,367 which hold that even slight damages will
support the accrual of a cause of action and trigger the running of
the statute of limitations.36 Among other things, adoption of a
"payment rule" would allow plaintiffs to indefinitely defer accrual
of malpractice claims.369 Accordingly, the court formally adopted
the dissenting opinion of Justice Poff in Duesterdick and over-
ruled the majority opinion in the case.37° The court went on to af-
on September 11, 2002. Id. The trial judge held that the nonsuited action did not toll the
statute of limitations and no error was assigned to this ruling on appeal. Id. at 500, 593
S.E.2d at 322. Thus, the applicable filing date for purposes of the decision was September
11, 2002. Id. In a footnote at the end of the decision, however, the court pointed out that
no argument had been presented as to the potential tolling effect of the bankruptcy or the
nonsuited action and stated, "hence, we express no opinion on such arguments in the pre-
sent disposition." Id. at 509 n.7, 593 S.E.2d at 327 n.7.
361. Id. at 502, 593 S.E.2d at 323 (citing Keller v. Denny, 232 Va. 512, 352 S.E.2d 327
(1987)).
362. Id. at 502, 593 S.E.2d at 322.
363. 217 Va. 763, 232 S.E.2d 774 (1977).
364. Id. at 766, 232 S.E.2d at 776.
365. Shipman, 267 Va. at 507, 593 S.E.2d at 325.
366. 195 Va. 827, 80 S.E.2d 574 (1954).
367. 217 Va. 751, 232 S.E.2d 895 (1977).
368. Shipman, 267 Va. at 503, 593 S.E.2d at 323.
369. Id. at 507, 593 S.E.2d at 326.
370. Id. at 509, 593 S.E.2d at 327.
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firm the trial court's dismissal of the case following the reasoning
advanced by Kruck.371
In Richmeade, L.P. v. City of Richmond,372 the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that claims for regulatory takings are subject to
the three-year statute of limitations as being akin to implied con-
tracts, rather than the five-year statute of limitations for damage
to property. 3 In that case, Richmeade requested that the city va-
cate a street separating two parcels owned by the partnership in
order to permit joint development of the property.3 74 City Council
initially agreed, but then reversed itself and refused to vacate the
street.375 Richmeade brought a claim for inverse condemnation al-
leging that its property had been "taken or damaged" by the city's
action.376
The trial court sustained a plea of the statute of limitations on
the basis that the action had been brought more than three years
after accrual, citing Prendergast v. Northern Virginia Regional
Park Authority.377 In Prendergast, the plaintiff alleged that water
from restoration work on the Authority's property had flooded the
lower level of its adjacent building.37 Among the claims asserted
was one for inverse condemnation. 79 The Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held that the inverse condemnation claim was subject to the
three-year statute of limitations on the basis that the claim was
analogous to a contract implied at law. °
On appeal, Richmeade argued that its injury could more prop-
erly be characterized as an injury to property subject to the five-
year statute of limitations of Virginia Code section 8.01-243.381 It
also argued that "the object of the litigation and not its form de-
371. Id.
372. 267 Va. 598, 594 S.E.2d 606 (2004).
373. Id. at 602, 594 S.E.2d at 608. The three-year statute of limitations for implied con-
tracts is set forth in Virginia Code section 8.01-246 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
Virginia Code section 8.01-243(B) (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004) sets the statute of
limitations for claims for damage to property at five years.
374. Richmeade, 267 Va. at 600, 594 S.E.2d at 607.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 608 (citing Prendergast v. N. Va. Reg'l Park Auth., 227 Va. 190,
313 S.E.2d 399 (1984)).
378. Prendergast, 227 Va. at 192, 313 S.E.2d at 400.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 194-95, 313 S.E.2d at 401.
381. Richmeade, 267 Va. at 602-03, 594 S.E.2d at 609.
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termines the applicability of a statute of limitations"38 2 and that
"the object of every inverse condemnation action is to recover for
injury to property."383 The Supreme Court of Virginia disagreed,
stating: "[t]o take or damage property in the constitutional sense
does not require that the sovereign actually invade or disturb the
property. Taking or damaging property in the constitutional
sense means that the governmental action adversely affects the
landowner's ability to exercise a right connected to the prop-
erty."3" The court agreed that Prendergast controlled385 and af-
firmed the trial court's dismissal of the action. 8
XIX. SERVICE OF PROCESS
In Lifestar Response of Maryland, Inc. v. Vegosen,8" the Su-
preme Court of Virginia interpreted and applied the "curing stat-
ute."388 In that case, Vegosen served an amended motion for
judgment on Lifestar which did not include the notice of motion
for judgment prepared by the clerk.389 Lifestar failed to respond,
and default judgment was entered by the trial court in the
amount of $100,000.39" Thereafter, Lifestar filed a motion to va-
cate pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-428(A)(ii) on the basis
that it had not been served with process and the trial court had
therefore not acquired jurisdiction over Lifestar.3 1' The trial court
held that Lifestar had actual knowledge of the proceedings392 and
invoked the curing statute, Virginia Code section 8.01-288, which
382. Id. at 602, 594 S.E.2d at 609.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 608.
386. Id. at 604, 594 S.E.2d at 610.
387. 267 Va. 720, 594 S.E.2d 589 (2004).
388. Id. at 722, 594 S.E.2d at 590 (referring to VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-288 (Repl. Vol.
2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004)).
389. Id. at 722 n.1, 594 S.E.2d at 590 n.1.
390. Id. at 722-23, 594 S.E.2d at 590.
391. Id. at 723, 594 S.E.2d at 590.
392. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 590-91. The notice of motion for judgment includes official no-
tice that a responsive pleading must be filed within twenty-one days. In this case, the trial
court found that plaintiffs counsel had orally notified Lifestar's registered agent of the
date responsive pleadings were due. Id.
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provides that defects in the manner of service are cured upon
proof of timely and actual receipt by the defendant.3
The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed, holding that "process"
includes both the plaintiffs pleading and the notice of motion for
judgment issued by the clerk.394 Without service of both docu-
ments, the defendant has not been served with "process," and the
trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over Lifestar.395 As to the
application of the curing statute, the court held that it cures only
defects in the manner of serving process, but not defects in the
process itself. 96 In this case, "process," meaning the plaintiffs
pleading and the notice of motion for judgment, never reached
Lifestar.397 Thus, the curing statute had no application and the
trial court was in error in awarding default judgment and in de-
nying Lifestar's motion to vacate.398
XX. RULE AMENDMENTS
Effective January 1, 2003, the Supreme Court of Virginia
amended Rules 4: 1(c), regarding protective orders;3 9 4:12, regard-
ing motions to compel discovery; 00 and 4:15, regarding motions
practice generally to require the moving party to append a certifi-
cation "that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted
to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the
dispute without court action."4 1
The Supreme Court of Virginia announced an amendment to
Rule 1:12, effective October 15, 2003, relating to service by elec-
393. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-288 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
394. Lifestar, 267 Va. at 725, 594 S.E.2d at 591-92. Rule 3:3(c) sets out the form of the
notice of motion for judgment and provides that "[tihe clerk shall issue the notice and at-
tach it to a copy of the motion for judgment, and the combined papers shall constitute the
notice of motion for judgment to be served as a single paper." VA. SUP. CT. R. 3:3(c) (Repl.
Vol. 2004).
395. Lifestar, 267 Va. at 725, 594 S.E.2d at 591-92.
396. Id.
397. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 591.
398. Id., 594 S.E.2d at 591-92.
399. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:1(c) (Repl. Vol. 2004).
400. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:12 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
401. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:15 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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tronic mail.40 2 Previously, Rule 1:12 provided that copies of all
pleadings, motions, and other papers after service of initial proc-
ess be served by delivering, dispatching by commercial delivery
service, transmitting by facsimile, or mailing to all counsel of re-
cord.403 To these means of service, the court added "delivering by
electronic mail when consented to in writing signed by the person
to be served."40 4 The amendment also provided that "[s]ervice by
electronic mail under this Rule is not effective if the party making
service learns that the attempted service did not reach the person
to be served."40 '
Conforming amendments were also made to Rule 1:7, regard-
ing computation of time,40 6 Rule 1:13, regarding endorsements,4 7
and Rule 4:9, regarding production of documents408 to permit ser-
vice by electronic mail and to provide that one additional day be
added to the stipulated response time, as with service by com-
mercial delivery service or facsimile. 40 9 These rules now simply
refer to Rule 1:12, rather than specifying service by hand deliv-
ery, commercial delivery service, facsimile, or mail.410
Rule 4:7, concerning use of depositions in court proceedings,
was also amended, effective October 15, 2003.411 Previously, sub-
section (b) of Rule 4:7 only dealt with objections to admissibility,
but it now also governs "Form of Presentation" and provides that
a party may offer deposition testimony in stenographic or "non-
stenographic" form.412 If a party offers a deposition in "nonsteno-
graphic" form, "the offering party shall also provide the court
with a transcript of the portions so offered."413
Finally, effective as of February 1, 2004, the Supreme Court of
Virginia amended Rules 5:17, petition for appeal,4 4 5:18, brief in




406. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:7 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
407. VA. SUP. CT. R. 1:13 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
408. VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:9 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
409. Id.
410. VA. SuP. CT. R. 1.12 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
411. VA. SUP. CT. R. 4:7 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
412. Id. at 4:7(b).
413. Id.
414. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
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opposition,415 and 5:19, reply brief,4 16 to require the filing of seven
copies.41 7 Previously, each rule had required the filing of only four
418copies.
XXI. RECENT LEGISLATION
Among the more significant changes to title 8.01 in 2003 was
the adoption of Virginia Code section 8.01-15.1 relating to pro-
ceedings brought by an anonymous plaintiff.419 In the event
anonymous participation is contested, the party seeking to main-
tain anonymity must show "special circumstances" by reference to
a number of enumerated factors.42 ° These factors include: (i)
whether "the need for anonymity outweighs the public's interest
in knowing the party's identity;" (ii) whether the party is merely
attempting to avoid "annoyance" or is seeking to preserve privacy
in a "sensitive and highly personal matter," (iii) the risk of re-
taliatory physical or mental harm; (iv) the age of the persons
seeking anonymity; (v) "whether the action is against a govern-
mental or private party;" and (vi) "the risk of unfairness to other
parties."42" ' Even where a party is permitted to proceed anony-
mously, all parties to the litigation have the right to know the
true identity of the anonymous party, subject to entry of a confi-
dentiality order by the court, and to conduct appropriate discov-
ery.
422
The General Assembly also adopted a significant revision to the
Medical Malpractice Act in 2003.421 Section 8.01-581.20 was
amended to provide that in any proceeding subject to the Act, a
party may only call two expert witnesses per medical discipline.424
This provision does not apply to treating physicians as to which
415. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:18 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
416. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:19 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
417. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:17, 5:18, 5:19 (Repl. Vol. 2004).
418. Id.
419. Act of Mar. 18, 2003, ch. 572, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-
15.1).
420. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-15.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
421. Id.
422. Id. at § 8.01-15.1(B).
423. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 251, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-581.20 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
424. Id.
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there is no limitation.425 The trial court may, upon good cause
shown, grant leave for additional experts to be called. Such leave,
however, is to be conditioned upon payment to the opposing party
of costs for discovery necessitated by the additional experts.426
Virginia Code section 8.01-606 permits relatively modest
amounts under the control of the court and payable to persons
under a legal disability to be disbursed directly.42 7 Otherwise, the
appointment of a guardian is required along with the attendant
expense of posting a bond, filing annual accountings, etc.428 For-
merly, the amount the court was permitted to disburse pursuant
to the statute was $10,000.429 In 2003, the General Assembly in-
creased this sum to $15,000.430
In 2004, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
16.1-77 to provide that counterclaims and cross-claims in com-
mercial unlawful detainer cases are not subject to the $15,000
limitation applicable to actions in General District Courts.43' Pre-
viously, the $15,000 limitation did not apply to claims for unlaw-
ful detainer involving non-residential property, but counterclaims
and cross-claims were arguably subject to the court's normal ju-
risdictional limitations.432
One of the more far reaching amendments passed by the Gen-
eral Assembly in 2004 was chapter 1014 of the Acts of Assembly,
which amended Virginia Code section 8.01-413 along with sec-
tions 2.2-3705, 16.1-266, 16.1-343, 32.1-127.1:03, 37.1-67.3, 37.1-
134.9, 37.1-134.12, 37.1-134.21, 37.1-226 through 37.1-230, and
38.2-608, 433 largely to bring these statutes into conformity with
certain provisions of the federal Health Insurance Portability and
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-606(A) (Cum. Supp. 2004).
428. Id. § 8.01-606(B).
429. Act of Mar. 16, 2003, ch. 195, 2003 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
430. Id.
431. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 344, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-77 (Supp. 2004)).
432. Id.
433. Act of Apr. 21, 2004, ch. 1014, 2004 Va. Acts _ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.2-3705, 8.01-413 (Cum. Supp. 2004), 16.1-266, -343 (Supp. 2004), 32.1-127.1:03
(Supp. 2004), 37.1-67.3, -134.9, -134.12, -134.21, -226 to -230 (Cum. Supp. 2004), and 38.2-
608 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
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Accountability Act434 and related federal regulations.
Virginia Code section 8.01-413(B) previously provided that pa-
tient records were to be furnished by any health care provider
upon request of the patient or any authorized attorney or insurer
making such request on behalf of the patient.4 35 This requirement
was subject, however, to an exception where the "treating physi-
cian" had made a written statement part of the medical record to
the effect that disclosure to the patient would be "injurious to the
patient's health or well being."436 The amendment added "clinical
psychologist" to this provision and changed the standard for
withholding disclosure to situations where disclosure would be
"reasonably likely to endanger the life or physical safety of the
patient or another person" or where "such health records make
reference to a person, other than a health care provider, and the
access requested would be reasonably likely to cause substantial
harm to such referenced person.
Finally, a new provision was inserted for third-party review
where disclosure is being withheld pursuant to this exception. 38
The third-party review may be done by a physician or clinical
psychologist with credentials comparable to the treating physi-
cian or clinical psychologist of the patient's choosing and at the
patient's expense; or by a physician or clinical psychologist not
involved in the original treatment selected by the health care
provider and at the health care provider's expense. 39
Virginia Code section 8.01-417 was amended to provide that
parties obtaining documents by subpoena are required to provide
copies, upon request, to any other party."0 This requirement is
subject to payment of reasonable copying charges." 1 Previously,
this statute only addressed the right of an injured party to obtain
a copy of his own witness statement from opposing parties." 2
434. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
435. Act of Apr. 21, 2004, ch. 1014, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE





440, Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 345, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
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Appeal bonds are subject to a $25 million limitation pursuant
to Virginia Code section 8.01-676.1."' 3 Under prior law, this limi-
tation applied to "noncompensatory" damages only.444 The Gen-
eral Assembly amended section 8.01-676.1 to provide that the $25
million limitation applied to all damages. 45
Pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-380, a plaintiff may
take a nonsuit at any time until a motion to strike has been
granted, the jury has retired for its deliberation of the case, or the
matter has been submitted for decision by the court.4 ' This right
is subject to the assessment of travel costs and fees of expert wit-
nesses if a nonsuit is taken within seven days of trial. 47 Previ-
ously, this provision had been triggered if the nonsuit was taken
within five days of trial.448
The amendment of pleadings to correct a misnomer is governed
by Virginia Code section 8.01-6." It provides that for statute of
limitations purposes, the amendment will relate back to the
original filing date of the action if (i) the amended claim arose out
of the same transaction or occurrence as the original pleading; (ii)
the defendant received notice of the action within the statute of
limitations period; (iii) the defendant is not prejudiced in main-
taining his defense on the merits; and (iv) the defendant knew or
should have known that, but for mistake concerning the identity
of the proper party, the action would have been brought against
the defendant. 410 The amendment to this statute now includes
situations where the defendant "or his agent" had knowledge of
the action.4 5 1 As to amendments based on confusion of trade
names, the statute already contained the language relating to
agents. 52
443. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-676.1 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
444. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 356, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-676.1 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
445. Id.
446. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-380 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
447. Id.
448. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 362, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-380 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
449. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
450. Id.
451. Act of Mar. 15, 2003, ch. 141, 2004 Va. Acts -(codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-6 (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
452. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-6.2 (Repl. Vol. 2000 & Cum. Supp. 2004).
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Virginia Code sections 16.1-88.03 and 55-246.1 permit certain
non-attorneys to appear in General District Court.453 This typi-
cally occurs in unlawful detainer cases, and the statute formerly
permitted licensed real estate brokers or agents or "resident
managers" to appear in such cases.454 These sections have been
amended to permit any authorized employee, property manager
or managing agent, in addition to licensed real estate brokers or
agents, to both sign pleadings and appear to take judgment for
455rent and/or possession.
In Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz & Kelly, P.C.,456 the Su-
preme Court of Virginia held that a claim for legal malpractice
involving the preparation of a revocable trust did not accrue dur-
ing the decedent's lifetime since no damages were sustained until
the assessment of estate taxes due to the allegedly negligently
prepared trust.457 Since there was no claim during the decedent's
life, pursuant to Virginia Code section 8.01-25, no claim survived
the decedent's death.45' The General Assembly amended Virginia
Code section 64.1-145 to modify this result in the case of irrevo-
cable trusts.459 By statute, such a claim will exist and survive the
death of the grantor.46 ° It will be deemed to accrue upon comple-
tion of the representation in which the alleged malpractice oc-
curred and is subject to a five-year statute of limitations for writ-
ten engagements or three years for oral engagements. 4 1 No
action may be maintained if damages could reasonably be avoided
or result from a change in law subsequent to the representa-
tion.462 Revocable trusts will continue to be subject to the holding
in Rutter.463
The General Assembly also amended the venue provision of
Virginia Code section 8.01-262 to include among the Category B,
453. Id. §§ 16.1-88.03, 55-246.1 (Supp. 2004).
454. Id.
455. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 338, 2004 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-1-88.03, 55-246.1) (Supp. 2004)).
456. 264 Va. 310, 568 S.E.2d 693 (2002).
457. Id. at 314, 568 S.E.2d at 695.
458. Id. at 313-14, 568 S.E.2d at 694-95.
459. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 368, 2004 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 64.1-145) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
460. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-145 (Cum. Supp. 2004).
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. See Rutter, 264 Va. at 314, 568 S.E.2d at 695.
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or permissible venues, any place where the defendant "regularly
conducts substantial business activity."464 Previously, this provi-
sion permitted actions to be brought where the defendant "regu-
larly conducts affairs or business activity."465
Finally, the General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections
8.01-407 and 16.1-265, relating to attorney-issued subpoenas, to
remove the restriction on the issuance of such subpoenas within
five days of trial.466 Under the amendment, attorney-issued sub-
poenas are subject to the same time limitations as clerk-issued
subpoenas.46v The court is not required to enforce any subpoena
issued within five days of trial, nor is the sheriff required to serve
such subpoenas.468
464. Act of Apr. 15, 2004, ch. 979, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-262) (Cum. Supp. 2004)).
465. Id.
466. Act of Apr. 8, 2004, ch. 335, 2004 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-407 (Cum. Supp. 2004), 16.1-265 (Supp. 2004)).
467. Id.
468. Id.
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